The US is turning its aging F-16s into long-range ship killers with stealthy anti-ship missiles—an upgrade that raises firepower, flexibility and big questions about survivability and stockpiles in a potential Pacific fight with China.
The US Navy has revealed plans to incorporate the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) into the US Air Force F-16 fighters, significantly enhancing their ability to target well-defended ships at longer ranges, The War Zone (TWZ) recently reported.
This effort provides Lockheed Martin with a Cost-Plus Fixed Fee Delivery Order for the integration and testing of the missile, according to a contracting notice from the Naval Air Systems Command.
The LRASM, derived from the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), provides advanced stealth capabilities, autonomous route planning and terminal-phase targeting using passive imaging infrared sensors.
The integration addresses the US military’s broader efforts to expand air-launched anti-ship capacity amid preparations for a potential conflict with China in the Pacific.
Currently deployed on US Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and Air Force B-1 bombers, the LRASM offers superior performance over the older AGM-84 Harpoon. The LRASM has a 965-kilometer range and advanced electronic support measures.
The decision aligns with ongoing US concerns regarding munitions stockpiles and the need for flexible, distributed launch platforms. The move will enhance US strategic deterrence by equipping globally ubiquitous F-16s with LRASMs, opening potential export avenues and reinforcing allied capabilities in regions like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The timeline for operational deployment, however, remains unspecified.
At the tactical level, the F-16 lacks critical features enabling survivability in a modern aerial warfare environment. However, the LRASM could allow ubiquitous F-16s to complement existing stealth aircraft and long-range bombers in a maritime strike role.
In an August 2024 article for The National Interest (TNI), Harrison Kass argues that the 50-year-old F-16 design lacks the stealth capabilities critical for modern air warfare. Kass says that, due to improving air defense and detection technology, the F-16 may be limited to situations where air superiority has been achieved.
However, the LRASM’s long range allows delivery aircraft to stay out of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses while using ubiquitous F-16s increases the number of launch aircraft that could bolster US conventional firepower for maritime strikes.
David Nahom mentions in an April 2022 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that the F-16 will continue to be the US Air Force’s low-end, multipurpose force multiplier. Nahom says the US Air Force’s 600-plus F-16s still have 18-20 years of life left, and the need for a replacement aircraft is still far off.
However, the same may not be said about US LRASM stockpiles. In a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Seth Jones mentions that in a simulated conflict over Taiwan, the US expended its entire inventory of 450 LRASMs in just a week, with LRASMs taking two years to replace at US$3 million per round.
At the operational level, the F-16’s relatively limited range of 860 kilometers in an air-to-surface role may handicap its utility in a Pacific operational environment characterized by vast distances.
While forward basing can mitigate some of these operational challenges, Kelly Grieco and other writers mention in a December 2024 Stimson Center report that US forward air bases in Japan, Guam and other Pacific locations are vulnerable to China’s long-range missiles, threatening to halt US forward air operations.
Grieco and others say that the destruction of US forward airbases could prevent the US from using aerial refueling tankers, which enable the latter’s fighters to reach their targets, preventing them from reaching the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. They also note that lacking aerial refueling capabilities can degrade long-range maritime strike operations.
While Greco and others note that the US Air Force could attempt to fly aircraft from farther locations such as Australia, Alaska or Hawaii, the long distances involved could reduce the number of sorties flown daily, making airpower difficult to wield decisively.
Brian Clark mentions in an article this month for National Defense Magazine that the lack of forward basing operations could lead to pilots doing 965-kilometer (1,000-mile) transits to get weapons into launch range and then fly 800 kilometers (500 miles) more to reach the Taiwan Strait.
Clark says that would limit LRSAM effectiveness by forcing them to travel straight ahead to reach their targets, thus making their flight paths predictable to the enemy, because maneuvering would cause them to run out of fuel.
At the strategic level, the article points out that it isn’t clear whether the US Air Force wishes to stick to its favored role of using B-21 or B-2 bombers to achieve air superiority by attacking Chinese airbases on the mainland or focus on maritime strike roles.
While attacking the Chinese mainland could result in nuclear retaliation, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and other writers mention in a November 2024 RAND report that China may be prepared to tolerate some conventional strikes on the mainland.
Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others say this situation implies a willingness to take low-intensity damage to high-value mainland targets without resorting to nuclear signaling. They mention China prioritizes cost mitigation by building sophisticated air defenses to cancel the coercive power of limited US strikes on the mainland.
In line with that, Clark argues that China could tolerate the loss of some airbases on the mainland, as losing some would not stop an amphibious assault force from landing on Taiwan. He says focusing on amphibious transport as targets may change China’s calculus.
However, Dmitry Filipoff mentions in a March 2023 Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) article that even if one missile hit can put a warship out of action, modern high-end warships feature sophisticated layered air defenses that drive up the volume of fire needed to overwhelm targets and score a hit.
Further, Mark Gunzinger and Stacey Pettyjohn point out in a July 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that the LRASM is still cost-prohibitive to procure in large numbers and that the US Air Force and the US Department of Defense (DOD) couldn’t simply buy enough to meet requirements, even if production is upscaled.
While such a situation incentivizes the production of lower-cost precision-guided munitions (PGM) for “affordable mass,” Gunzinger argues in a November 2021 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that US inventories of legacy munitions are insufficient, with many munitions either too vulnerable, too few or too costly for large-scale, sustained operations against advanced adversaries.
Meanwhile, he points out that shorter-range direct-attack munitions expose stealth aircraft to lethal air defenses. He says that while mid-range “stand-in” PGMs, optimized for stealth platforms, are proposed as a cost-effective solution, the US lacks adequate production capacity and stockpiles for rapid wartime demand.
