Hypersonic weapons promise game-changing war-fighting capabilities, but unresolved technological flaws, operational vulnerabilities and strategic risks may outweigh their potential advantage for the US military.
This month, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report saying that despite the US’s intensified efforts to develop hypersonic weapons, significant questions persist about their operational performance in real-world scenarios.
While rivals Russia and China have reportedly deployed operational hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), the US remains focused on conventionally armed systems requiring higher accuracy and advanced technology than their nuclear-armed counterparts.
However, no US hypersonic weapon system has reached full operational status and prototypes continue to undergo evaluation. Critics question the necessity of these weapons for deterrence and highlight their undefined mission roles and high costs.
Meanwhile, adversaries’ advancements in hypersonic technology raise concerns about eroding the US’s qualitative edge.
Despite a substantial budget increase to US$6.9 billion for hypersonic research in FY2025, issues surrounding detection, defense and the feasibility of wide-area protection against such threats remain unresolved.
US missile defense systems are ill-equipped to counter hypersonic threats, as the weapons are built to evade conventional tracking and interception frameworks.
Analysts are divided on the utility of these investments, while the US Congress must balance enhancing offensive capabilities and strengthening hypersonic defense in the face of mounting Chinese and Russian threats.
This ambiguity complicates the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategic calculus and may necessitate new arms control measures or risk mitigation strategies.
At the tactical level, Andreas Schmidt mentions in a 2024 Military Review article that hypersonic weapons offer significant advantages through their high speed, maneuverability and survivability. Because they can reach speeds beyond Mach 5, they minimize the reaction time of enemy defenses and reduce the chances of interception.
Schmidt adds that these weapons can avoid exo-atmospheric missile defenses by operating within the atmosphere at altitudes between 20 and 60 kilometers and can perform planned and reactive maneuvers to avoid interceptors while delivering rapid and accurate impacts.
However, in a January 2022 Defense One article, Joshua Pollack mentions that US hypersonic weapons tests often fail because of aggressive development schedules and immature technologies.
The DOD’s rush to rapidly prototype and test these weapons has led to poor design, inadequate testing and insufficient oversight, Pollack argues. Failed tests involving the AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) and the US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), along with a canceled test in March 2023 due to battery issues, highlight these challenges.
Despite multiple setbacks, Francis Mahon and Punch Moulton argue in a January 2025 article for 1945 that adopting a “Fail Fast” approach is crucial for US missile dominance.
This method involves rapid testing, learning from failures and iterative improvements, and accelerating innovation and technological advancement. They say frequent testing and accepting failures allow the US to quickly adapt and enhance its hypersonic capabilities, ensuring it stays ahead of near-peer competitors like China and Russia.
Even if the US gets its hypersonic weapons program up to speed, David Wright and Cameron Tracy mention in a March 2024 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article that significant accuracy challenges arise due to extreme thermal stress and communication disruptions during flight.
These issues damage sensitive electronics and affect targeting systems, the report says. High drag during low-altitude flight can also slow hypersonic weapons, making them easier targets for missile defense systems.
Shawn Rostker argues in a RealClear Defense article that the high cost of hypersonic weapons—one-third more than ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads—does not justify their tactical benefits. Cruise missiles or drones may suffice for many missions, Rostker says.
At the operational level, the US must integrate hypersonic missiles to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies and ensure command-and-control resilience against adversary interference.
In a separate January 2025 RealClear Defense article, Mahon and Moulton mention that hypersonic missiles effectively counter US near-peer adversaries’ A2/AD approach.
These weapons can breach and neutralize integrated air defense systems from a distance and overcome long-range anti-ship systems, granting US air and naval forces greater operational freedom.
However, Heather Penney mentions in a May 2023 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that US kill chains—the sequence of steps needed to detect and attack targets—are vulnerable due to their dependence on interconnected components.
China has developed means to jam networks or sensors and defeat weapons in the end stage of the attack, potentially breaking the kill chain at every step.
At the strategic level, the US must assess the necessity of nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons for strategic deterrence against advanced missile defenses while managing risks of miscalculation and escalation.
Despite the US emphasis on conventionally armed hypersonic weapons, Stephen Reny mentions in a 2020 Strategic Studies Quarterly article that the US may consider nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons necessary to counter advanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and restore a credible second-strike capability vis-à-vis China and Russia’s modernizing nuclear arsenals.
Nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons can bypass missile defenses, ensuring credible retaliation and maintaining global deterrence stability.
However, Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif argue in a September 2021 Arms Control Association (ACA) report that hypersonic weapons challenge strategic stability by increasing the risks of escalation and arms races.
Their speed and maneuverability reduce response time, complicating threat assessment and increasing the chances of miscalculation. They create risks through target and warhead ambiguity, where attacks on dual-use facilities might be mistaken for nuclear strikes.
America’s stalling US hypersonic weapons program is ultimately a race against failure—one where time, technology and strategy intersect. Whether the US can overcome its challenges and match the pace set by its adversaries will shape the future of military dominance.
More than an arms race, hypersonic weapon competition defines today’s geopolitical contest, and the US must decide whether to accelerate, recalibrate or rethink its approach, arguably before it is too late.
