The race for space dominance is intensifying as the US Space Force embraces directed-energy weapons, jammers and kinetic systems to counter China and Russia’s escalating orbital warfare capabilities.
The space war plan, designed to achieve “space superiority”, was outlined by General Chance Saltzman at the recent Air & Space Forces Association Warfare Symposium, Task & Purpose reported.
While traditional military branches have historically explored space weaponry, the US Space Force’s contemporary approach includes offensive and defensive tools for terrestrial and orbital operations.
This approach marks a shift from the branch’s initial focus on satellite network development for communication and missile detection. Directed energy weapons like lasers and jammers are favored for neutralizing enemy satellites without generating harmful debris in space.
Saltzman also revealed plans for a foundational doctrine, “Space Force Doctrine Document One,” which will define the agency’s vision for space operations.
Initiatives such as the secretive X-37B space plane underscore the broader strategic vision for orbital control. The US Space Force’s intent to diversify its arsenal reflects its evolving role in maintaining strategic dominance in space, leveraging advanced technologies to counteract adversarial capabilities while minimizing collateral risks.
Illustrating the growing capabilities of near-peer adversarial threats, CNN reported this month that China and Russia are aggressively testing offensive space capabilities, highlighting their increasing space militarization.
According to the report, Russia has recently conducted satellite training missions, practicing “attack and defend tactics” in the Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), while China demonstrated advanced co-orbital satellite maneuvers in December 2024.
The CNN report says both nations are developing technologies such as anti-satellite missiles and directed-energy weapons to disrupt or destroy enemy satellites.
Directed energy weapons encompass lasers and microwaves. Lasers could overheat or melt sensitive components or blind sensors on satellites. Microwaves can induce electric currents that could “fry” satellite electronics, destroying the satellite without breaking it apart.
While not considered a directed energy weapon, jamming works by flooding satellites with false signals or noise, drowning out their control signals and temporarily making them inoperable.
An August 2021 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report describes space as the “ultimate high ground,” critical to communications, intelligence and missile warning surveillance operations. The report notes that near-peer adversaries like China and Russia have studied warfighting concepts and focused on space systems as a particular US vulnerability.
Such developments give rise to a new form of space warfare. In a February 2025 Modern Warfare Institute (MWI) article, Alan Dugger explains the concept of orbital warfare. Unlike terrestrial battles, Dugger says orbital warfare is defined by subtle maneuvers, strategic positioning and kinetic and non-kinetic methods to disrupt or disable adversary assets.
He mentions that the concept revolves around controlling orbital slots and leveraging technologies like cyberattacks, electronic jamming and directed energy to achieve dominance without creating debris.
Further, Jessica Getrost writes in a June 2024 podcast for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that orbital warfare involves more than two vehicles maneuvering around each other. Getrost says orbital warfare involves executing offensive and defensive fires to preserve freedom of action in space.
In the same podcast, Charles Galbreath emphasizes the foundational role of space domain awareness (SDA) in orbital warfare, emphasizing reaction time to prepare for attacks against space-based assets to ensure continuous space-based support for warfighters.
Further on orbital warfare, US Space Doctrine Publication 3-0 defines space superiority as “a relative degree of control in space of one force over another that would permit the conduct of its operations without prohibitive interference from the adversary while simultaneously denying their opponent freedom of action in the domain at a given time.”
However, these conceptual developments may have to be implemented amid an architectural shift in space-based military capabilities, which are now moving from a few expensive satellites to proliferated satellite constellations.
Illustrating that shift, Breaking Defense reported this month that the US Space Force is reevaluating its reliance on costly, singular satellite systems in favor of a proliferated satellite architecture, as confirmed by Major General Stephen Purdy.
Breaking Defense says this shift aims to enhance resilience and cost-efficiency by leveraging commercial alternatives for space situational awareness and other critical capabilities.
The report mentions that the US Space Systems Command is analyzing legacy programs, including Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability, to identify opportunities for commercial integration. It points out this approach may require scaling back stringent requirements to achieve faster deployment and reduced expenses.
Douglas Youvan highlights the advantages of satellite constellations, mentioning that they offer redundancy, resilience and versatility, making them formidable assets in potential conflict scenarios. Youvan says they can provide continuous coverage, adapt to evolving mission needs and mitigate the risk of losing a single satellite.
However, Youvan points out that their very nature – being small, numerous and relatively cheap – means they could be used in more aggressive postures, adding to space congestion and amplifying the risk of unintentional escalations.
Aside from the tactical and operational advantages afforded by proliferated microsatellite constellations, Dugan says hiding military goals within civilian activities introduces strategic uncertainty, enabling state actors to operate covertly on the global stage without detection or opposition.
This intermingling of civilian and military capabilities and operations in space enables the conduct of gray zone operations in the domain.
In a July 2024 article for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Mike Carey and Charlie McGillis mention that intermingling civilian and military activities in space allows states to exert influence below the threshold of armed conflict.
Carey and McGillis point out that the US and its adversaries, including China and Russia, leverage commercial space assets for strategic objectives, complicating attribution and response.
They say non-kinetic tactics—such as jamming, spoofing and cyberattacks—degrade satellite capabilities while maintaining plausible deniability. They also mention that space technology’s dual-use nature blurs the lines between civilian and military operations, making deterrence challenging.
As the militarization of space accelerates, the fusion of advanced technology, strategic deception and great-power competition is transforming Earth’s orbit into the next battlefield.
