Delays and cost overruns in the US Columbia-class SSBN program threaten the credibility of its undersea nuclear deterrent and ability to match China’s naval expansion.”
The US Navy’s plan to replace its aging undersea nuclear deterrent faces costly delays, raising concerns about the credibility of its posture and future ability to keep pace with China’s naval expansion.
This month, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report mentioning that the US Navy faces an estimated 12 to 16-month delay in the delivery of its first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), threatening the timely replacement of aging Ohio-class SSBNs.
The delay, attributed to shipyard workforce shortages, supply chain disruptions and component delivery setbacks—particularly Northrop Grumman’s late turbine generators and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ bow section—raises concerns about the impact on subsequent submarines.
The US Navy is considering extending the service life of up to five Ohio-class boats to mitigate risks, but this strategy involves additional costs and logistical hurdles.
Meanwhile, the simultaneous construction of Columbia-class SSBNs and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) presents industrial-base challenges as shipyards and suppliers struggle to scale production. The US Navy and industry aim to increase Virginia-class production to two boats annually by 2028, yet the current output remains at 1.1-1.2 submarines per year.
Rising costs compound the issue, with the Columbia-class program’s procurement budget growing 12.1% in the past year alone. Further overruns could siphon funding from other US Navy shipbuilding programs, placing additional strain on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) long-term naval strategy.
Amid ballooning costs and delays, the US may need to ramp up submarine production more urgently than ever. In an article this month for We Are The Mighty, Logan Nye mentions that, at present, China relies on anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) such as the DF-21D and DF-26B to keep US carrier battlegroups at bay from Taiwan.
Nye points out those ASBMs are useless against SSNs that can evade them by diving. He also emphasizes that SSNs are self-sufficient for months, which may be critical if US supply chains in the Pacific are threatened.
Further, in a 2024 American Affairs article, Jerry Hendrix suggests that SSNs may be considered the “first response force” during a Taiwan conflict due to those advantages. However, Hendrix points out that the post-Cold War peace dividend eroded the US submarine industrial base, resulting in the US not having enough submarines when most needed.
The situation is not much better for the US SSBN fleet, as it too suffers from a weak US submarine industrial base. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) says that as of August 2024, 14 Ohio-class SSBNs form the foundation of the US sea-based nuclear deterrent.
According to NTI, each Ohio-class SSBN has 20 missile launch tubes armed with the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The report also says the US Navy is replacing these older missiles with the Trident II D5LE, which has an upgraded guidance system for improved accuracy.
The report mentions that assuming the US Navy has 12 operational Ohio-class SSBNs with 20 launch tubes each and four warheads per missile, they have 960 warheads. However, it mentions that only 8-10 Ohio-class SSBNs are typically deployed at one time due to regular minor repairs, so the number of active warheads in the field may be closer to 720.
The US Navy’s plan to retire Ohio-class SSBNs at approximately one per year starting in 2027 raises concerns about the credibility and survivability of the US undersea nuclear deterrent since they carry 54% of the US deployed nuclear arsenal.
Emphasizing the importance of the US SSBN fleet, Geoff Wilson and other writers mention in a February 2025 Stimson Center article that SSBNs are the cornerstone of the US “finite deterrence” doctrine, with SSBN stealth and survivability disincentivizing a first strike that would eliminate all other nuclear forces, creating strategic stability at lower cost.
Wilson and others argue that the US SSBN fleet can maintain deterrence against multiple targets at a lower cost than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which are less critical for deterrence than other delivery options such as bombers.
However, a smaller US SSBN fleet could undermine the credibility of the US undersea nuclear arsenal. In a June 2020 article for The Strategist, Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark argue that while the US sea-based nuclear arsenal is the most survivable leg of its nuclear triad, it is also the most brittle.
Mahnken and Clark argue that if an SSBN can’t launch its missiles, communicate with commanders or is destroyed, all its missiles will be lost. They also highlight that losing only one SSBN on patrol could eliminate an entire leg of the nuclear triad.
Further, they point out that the lethality of the US undersea nuclear deterrent has prompted near-peer adversaries like China and Russia to enhance their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to target US SSBNs.
Emphasizing the potential fragility of the US undersea nuclear arsenal, they project that during the 2030s, it is probable that only one Columbia-class SSBN will be operational at any given time in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, supported by one or two vessels at sea as backup.
Despite those fragility concerns, Owen Cote Jr mentions in a January 2019 article in the peer-reviewed Bulletin of Atomic Scientists journal that SSBNs remain the most credible deterrent for the US due to their unmatched survivability and stealth.
Cote Jr. highlights the historical effectiveness of US SSBNs, particularly during the Cold War, when they proved resilient against Soviet ASW capabilities. He also addresses concerns about emerging technologies, such as AI and quantum computing, which could make oceans transparent.
Regarding those concerns, Cote Jr says these fears are largely unfounded, emphasizing the US’s advanced acoustic surveillance systems, such as SOSUS and the Fixed Distributed System (FDS), that can detect Chinese or Russian submarines alongside its favorable maritime geography encompassing vast swathes of the Atlantic and Pacific, make it exceedingly difficult for near-peer adversaries to detect its SSBNs.
Further, Stephen Biddle and Eric Labs mention in a Foreign Policy article this month that while China’s shipbuilding capacity dwarfs the US’s by a factor of 230, US warships are typically larger and have superior sensors, electronics and weapons.
Contextualizing submarine capabilities, Biddle and Labs mention that China’s submarine force consists of mostly conventionally powered submarines, while the US operates an all-nuclear fleet of 49 SSNs, 14 SSBNs and four nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGN). They emphasize that, unlike their Chinese counterparts, US crews have battle experience and superior training.
However, Biddle and Labs say that China is building aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in half the time it takes the US to make the same vessels. They caution that the US places itself at serious risk by assuming future wars will be short and that debates over the US-China naval balance should be tempered by considering the dynamics of competitive production for naval wars of attrition.
