As China and North Korea’s missile threats close in and US stockpiles run thin, Japan is racing to build a Tomahawk-like missile, aiming to strike farther, faster and on its own terms.
This month, Naval News reported that Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) signed a 32.3 billion yen (US$219 million) contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) to develop a new “Surface-to-Ship/Surface-to-Surface Precision Guided Missile.”
The missile aims to improve its anti-ship and anti-ground performance through advancements in range, precision guidance and flight capabilities.
Development is scheduled to run from fiscal year 2024 to 2032, leveraging upgrades from MHI’s Type 12 surface-to-ship missile and elements of Kawasaki Heavy Industries’ “New Anti-Ship Missile for the Defense of Remote Islands.”
The missile features a fuel-efficient engine and aerodynamic wings, enabling extended horizontal flight, similar to the US Tomahawk. Intelligence satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will bolster targeting accuracy and penetration capabilities against high-value enemy targets.
As Japan accelerates efforts to counter China’s maritime aggression and North Korea’s missile advances, this defense initiative underscores Japan’s strategic shift to standoff weapons. An official from Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ALTA) noted that key project specifics, including engine design, remain undetermined.
The initiative complements Japan’s broader military modernization strategy, with tensions across East Asia fueling the urgency. In October 2023, Asia Times reported that Japan planned to acquire 400 US Tomahawk missiles, driven by escalating threats from China and North Korea.
Underscoring the evolving nature of China’s missile threat to Japan, Newsweek reported in March 2025 that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has deployed advanced missile systems capable of penetrating Japan’s ballistic missile defenses.
China’s DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and the CJ-10 and CJ-100 ground-launched cruise missiles pose significant risks to Japan’s mainland.
These missiles, stationed in northeastern Jilin and eastern Shandong provinces, have ranges of between 1,500 and 2,500 kilometers, covering Japan’s four main islands. Additionally, the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, operational in Anhui province, extends China’s strike capability to 4,000 kilometers.
Meanwhile, USNI reported in January 2025 that North Korea’s hypersonic missile test that month signals its intention to strengthen strategic deterrence capabilities. State media KCNA reported that the missile traveled 1,500 kilometers at Mach 12, following a “dual peak” trajectory before falling into the Sea of Japan.
However, Japan’s MOD and South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff provided contradictory data, indicating a maximum range of 1,100 kilometers and the absence of the claimed second peak.
Still, US Tomahawk missile production challenges may have influenced Japan’s decision to develop a similar indigenous missile. Reuben Johnson notes in a March 2025 article for 1945 that the US Navy faces a critical shortage of Tomahawk cruise missiles due to rapid expenditure rates outpacing production capabilities.
Recent conflicts, including the 2024 Yemen strikes, depleted stockpiles, with over 80 missiles used in a single day. Industry challenges stem from fluctuating procurement demands and insufficient production rates, compounded by a “just-in-time” manufacturing model that limits surge capacity.
Efforts to expand production through exports have yet to yield significant results. Additionally, unstable demand has caused bottlenecks in key components, such as rocket motors, further delaying replenishment. Current production rates remain inadequate, with orders from 2023 expected to deliver only five missiles monthly by 2025.
In a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Seth Jones notes that in nearly two dozen simulations of a US-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the US expended 400 Tomahawk missiles in just three weeks of conflict, with a Tomahawk Block V missile taking 25 months to replace.
This potential rapid depletion of stocks may leave little to spare for allies like Japan. However, upgrading the Type 12 into a longer-range, more powerful missile presents various technical challenges, says Masashi Murano in a March 2024 article by the US Studies Center (USSC).
An improved, longer-ranged Type 12 would require a satellite data link and its existing guidance system to enable real-time flight course updates, allowing for targeting time-sensitive targets, such as transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).
An upgraded Type 12 would also need various warhead types to crater runways and destroy hardened targets such as bunkers. China and North Korea are also likely to deploy robust defenses, necessitating the acquisition of electronic warfare decoys capable of imitating the signatures of strike aircraft to deceive their adversary’s defenses.
In addition, Murano points out that the long-range strike systems Japan is developing are expensive and that Japan has limited production capacity for such weapons. But to shoot far, Japan needs to see far.
In a March 2025 Breaking Defense article, Christopher Woody highlights that Japan’s reliance on the US for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) remains significant, with gaps in its “kill chain” capabilities necessitating US support for target detection and tracking. This leaves the possibility that the US will withdraw those critical capabilities when Japan would need them the most.
Notably, the temporary suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine in 2025 highlighted how such actions can significantly impact a nation’s defense operations, prompting US allies to reconsider their dependence on US military support and technology.
In the case of Ukraine, the loss of US intelligence support enabled Russia to retake significant parts of Kursk, upending Ukraine’s strategy of holding Russian territory as a bargaining chip for peace negotiations.
Such a decision may leave Japan facing a simple yet difficult choice – to build its independent counterstrike capabilities without US dependence or to continue embracing US technology while mitigating the risk of abandonment.
Veerle Nouwens and others note in a January 2024 report for the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) that while Japan has launched a reconnaissance satellite and pledged to launch small satellites for target detection and build over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, it will likely continue to depend on the US for these capabilities due to the cost and complexity of the associated equipment.
Further, Woody notes that the Trump administration’s transactional approach to alliances has further strained US-Japan relations, with demands for increased Japanese defense spending and critiques of Japan’s contributions to the alliance.
While Japan has pledged to double defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2027, political and economic challenges, including public resistance to tax hikes, complicate these plans. As Japan pivots from dependence to deterrence, the test will be whether its missiles fly farther than US assurances hold firm.
