
China’s next-generation stealth fighters are taking shape in plain sight—and they might be flying circles around the US’s still-grounded concepts.
This month, The Aviationist reported that recent images from Chinese internet sources have provided the clearest look yet at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s (SAC) stealth fighter, reportedly designated as the J-50.
Spotted first in December 2024, the tailless twin-engine aircraft features a lambda wing design, marking an apparent significant advancement in Chinese aviation technology. The latest photographs reveal enhanced details, including Diverterless Supersonic Intakes (DSI), 2D thrust vectoring nozzles and a tricycle landing gear system with a twin nose wheel.
Observers have noted its likely inclusion of both ventral and side weapon bays, as well as a bulge beneath the cockpit that could house an electro-optical sensor, akin to the J-35’s equivalent.
This aircraft is part of China’s push into sixth-generation fighter development, though its classification remains uncertain due to undefined generational specifications.
Its public flight in December 2024, commemorating Mao Zedong’s birthday, underscores a deliberate effort to unveil it as a show of strength. Reports suggest its debut flight may have occurred earlier, accompanied by a Chinese Flanker derivative as a chase plane.
While its precise role and capabilities remain speculative, the J-50 underscores China’s ambitions to solidify its position in cutting-edge military aviation technologies. No official comments have been made, and its operational timeline remains unclear.
Delving deeper into the J-50’s design features, Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway mention in a January 2025 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that the J-50’s tailless design with swiveling wingtips enhances roll and pitch control via advanced digital flight systems.
Newdick and Rogoway claim that this innovation mitigates the stability challenges inherent in tailless configurations, but due to the jointed surfaces, it compromises radar stealth. They point out that low articulation or locking these controls in cruise minimizes detection risks.
They note that twin thrust-vectoring nozzles enhance maneuverability, compensating for the design drawbacks associated with the heavy load. Although they say it is unclear whether the J-50 is a manned or unmanned aircraft, the unclear canopy details suggest a possible manned operation.
Newdick and Rogoway add that the J-50’s complex trailing edge control arrangements underscore the design’s focus on agility. Despite reduced low observability, they point out that the J-50 reflects bold trade-offs that favor control superiority.
These design features may allow the J-50 to offer superior agility and enhanced maneuverability in close-in engagements, allowing it to operate effectively within enemy air defense bubbles.
However, in a 2015 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) report, John Stillion mentions that aerial combat has shifted decisively from close-range dogfighting to engagements beyond visual range (BVR), mainly due to advances in sensors, weapons and communications.
Stillion says that radar-guided and infrared missiles have supplanted guns as the primary air-to-air weapons, enabling pilots to strike from dozens of kilometers away without visual contact. Consequently, he points out that maneuvering air combat is now considered high-risk and increasingly obsolete.
Posing a counterargument to Stillion’s views, Alex Hollings mentions in a May 2022 article for 1945 that historical data, such as Desert Storm, reveal that even with superior technology and situational awareness, nearly 40% of air engagements got within visual range, with some requiring traditional dogfighting maneuvers.
Hollings mentions that technological limitations, human error and chaotic combat environments can force close-range engagements. He says in large-scale conflicts, the sheer volume of aircraft and operational complexity make dogfights inevitable.
He adds that while stealth and long-range capabilities dominate strategy, the unpredictability of war ensures that dogfighting skills remain indispensable.
Alongside the J-36, the J-50 may suggest that China is pursuing a high-low force mix for its next-generation fighters. In this mix, larger, more expensive and more capable aircraft are paired with smaller, cheaper and less capable models.
A high-end fighter in a high-low force mix could be optimized for penetrating defended enemy airspace, requiring stealth, range and heavy armament.
In line with this, Bill Sweetman mentions in a December 2024 article for The Strategist that the J-36’s all-aspect stealth is achieved through a tailless configuration, unbroken edge lines and concealed sensor apertures, thereby minimizing its radar cross-section.
Sweetman notes that the J-36’s double-delta wing design allows for a large fuel capacity, enabling extended-range missions. Additionally, he says that the J-36, equipped with three engines, is optimized for supersonic cruise without afterburners, enhancing efficiency and reducing thermal signatures.
In contrast, a low-end fighter may be less capable overall and designed to operate within contested airspace rather than penetrating defended airspace. The J-50, with its purported emphasis on maneuverability for close-in fighting, may reflect that philosophy.
However, the J-36 and J-50 are still prototypes, forcing China to rely on the fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter, which could be the high-end fighter of China’s current in-service fighter fleet, with around 200-250 units already built as of 2023.
At the strategic level, the J-36 and J-50 could put China ahead of the US in the race for sixth-generation fighters. In contrast, the US Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform is still in the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase.
Highlighting this contrast, Abraham Abrams mentions in a January 2025 Aviation Geek Club article that China’s J-20 stealth fighter advanced from flight demonstrator to frontline service in just six years, in contrast to the US F-22 and F-35, which have taken 15 to 20 years.
Taking that timeline into consideration, Abrams notes that, given China’s industrial and technological advancements since then, it could easily field a sixth-generation jet years ahead of the US.
Wang Xiangsui mentions in a December 2024 article for The China Academy that China’s lead in hypersonic wind tunnel testing facilities enables super-precise feedback without having to transport aircraft test models to 100 kilometers in altitude, reduces the risk of espionage, improves the maturity of the technology testing machines and ensures fewer losses and greater safety for test pilots.
Wang notes that while US hypersonic wind tunnels such as its “Z Machine” can simulate speeds up to Mach 30, it can only do so for 30 milliseconds, making it unsuitable for sustained operation to test missiles and aircraft. In contrast, he notes that China’s JF-22 is designed for continuous operation of up to 130 milliseconds at Mach 30.
Underscoring the gap in testing technology, a February 2025 report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that the US faces significant limitations in its hypersonic weapons testing infrastructure, which hinders its ability to match the pace set by rivals such as China.
According to the report, the US Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a patchwork of 48 specialized facilities, including ground test sites, open-air ranges and mobile assets, many of which are outdated or located in academia.
The report also notes that China maintains a more robust hypersonic testing infrastructure, featuring more wind tunnels and flight test ranges, some of which can simulate speeds exceeding Mach 20.